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12 JUL 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: SNIE 10-1-67: Reactions to a
Certain US Course of Action

1. On 11 July, the USIB representatives concluded the clean-up sessions on SNIE 10-1-67, an estimate of Communist and Free World reactions to the establishment of an anti-infiltration system in South Vietnam and Laos. The estimate concludes that (1) North Vietnam would take countermeasures against the system and attempt to use alternative supply routes if necessary, but would not change its basic strategies in carrying out the war; (2) Communist political reactions would depend on the effectiveness of the system and the publicity given to it; (3) US relations with non-Communist countries (with the possible exception of Laos) would not be changed by installation of the system.
2. The Department of State may reserve on paragraph 12 of the estimate. This paragraph discusses penetration and harassment of the system as a means of breaching it and/or tying down large US forces in defensive positions. State feels the paragraph should point out that penetration and harassment actions will also be designed to inflict heavy US casualties.
3. OER made a substantial contribution to this estimate, and also led an unsuccessful attempt to make it fully responsive to the requester's needs. Although we have no major substantive disagreement with what the SNIE contains, we judge it to be an extremely vacuous effort in terms of the purposes for which it was requested.
4. A major purpose of the SNIE is to help the Secretary of Defense decide whether to buy the

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anti-infiltration system at a cost of \$2 billion. The initial request to DIA from General Starbird specifically asked for an assessment of the effectiveness of the system. Although this part of General Starbird's request was deleted by DIA in its memorandum to requesting the SNIE, we asked both orally and in writing for an estimate of effectiveness and raised the question frequently during considerations of the several drafts of the estimate. Members of General Starbird's Staff who briefed the Board and Representatives made the same request.

5. The decision not to evaluate the effectiveness of the system produced an odd estimate. Although allusions to effectiveness are made here and there, both political reactions and countermeasures are discussed at length without a discussion of the gross effectiveness of the system, or of its effectiveness after countermeasures are taken. In our view, the Communists would soon see that these countermeasures were adequate to make the system essentially ineffective.

/s/ [redacted]

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